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Abstract
In the past, several de(nitions of information #ow have been presented, based upon process
algebras. Unfortunately, all these appear to be either too weak—failing to identify certain subtle
forms of information #ow or too strong—indicating information #ow when there is none. In this
paper, we produce a de(nition that aims to overcome these shortcomings. We base our de(ni-
tion upon an operational model of CSP that reasons about the ways in which nondeterministic
choices can be resolved, and so is more discriminating than previous models. Our de(nition of
information #ow is then that the behaviour of one agent can have some in#uence upon another
agent’s view of the system. This de(nition gives the expected results on all thought experiments
tried to date, and also satis(es certain desirable properties.
c© 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The question of information $ow is of central importance in theoretical studies
of computer security. In its simplest form, it considers two users, High and Low
interacting with the same computer system, and asks if there is any #ow of information
from High to Low; in other words, can Low’s view of the system alter, depending upon
High’s behaviour? This is variously known as noninterference (can High’s behaviour
interfere with Low’s view of the system?), invariance (does Low’s view of the system
vary as a result of High’s behaviour?), nondeducibility (can Low deduce anything
about High’s behaviour?) or independence (is Low’s view of the system independent
of High’s behaviour?).
The normal motivating application for these questions is multi-level security, where
information #ows should not occur from a user High with a high level security
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clearance to a user Low at a lower security level. Roscoe [19] identi(es two possible
scenarios:
• Low is a spy who is trying to (nd out about High’s behaviour without High’s
knowledge;
• High is a “mole” who is trying to pass information to Low, possibly using some
pre-arranged scheme for representing information.
It turns out that these are subtly diFerent; in this paper, we shall be mostly considering
the latter scenario.
Several authors have attempted to formalise this notion of information #ow using
process algebras, typically CSP. Unfortunately, most previous attempts have produced
de(nitions that appear to be either too weak (failing to identify certain sources of
information #ow) or too strong (identifying processes as insecure when there seems to
be no way of using them to pass information).
In this paper we attempt to improve the situation, by producing a new de(nition
of information #ow. We believe that one of the reasons for the shortcomings of
previous de(nitions is that they are based upon semantic models that do not make
enough discriminations between processes, and in particular do not give enough
information about the ways in which nondeterministic choices are resolved.
We therefore have to introduce a new semantic model, which makes more
distinctions.
In the next section we give a brief overview of the syntax and traditional semantic
models of CSP. We then review some previous work, in Section 3, thereby helping to
illustrate the idea of information #ow, and also to explain some of the shortcomings
that we hope to avoid.
In Section 4 we give an informal description of the operational semantic model
we will be using. We formalise this operational model in Section 5, and then extract
denotational information from the model in Section 6. In Section 7 we formalise our
notion of security and consider some examples. We prove some results about our
de(nition in Section 8. We sum up in Section 9.
2. A brief overview of CSP
In this section we give a brief overview of CSP. More details can be obtained
from [10,19].
An event represents an atomic communication; this might either be between two
processes or between a process and the environment. Channels carry sets of events;
for example, a:x is an event of channel a. We write  for the set of all visible events,
and de(ne
 =̂ ∪ {};
where  represents an internal event. We write P for the alphabet of P (i.e. the set
of events P can perform).
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2.1. Syntax and operational semantics
We will consider the subset of CSP de(ned by:
P ∈ CSP ::= STOP | a→ P | P  P | P ✷ P |
P\A | P\A | P ‖
A
P | X•P:
In the paragraphs below we describe each of the CSP syntactic constructs, and give
an operational semantics to the language. We write
P a−−→ Q
to mean that the process P can perform the event a, and evolve into the process Q.
STOP. The process STOP can perform no events. It therefore has no transition rules.
Prexing. a→P is the process that can perform the event a, and then act like P:
a→ P a−−→ P:
Nondeterministic choice. P Q represents an internal or nondeterministic choice; the
process can act like either P or Q, with the choice being made according to some
criterion that we do not model. In the operational semantics, the resolution of the
nondeterministic choice is represented by a -transition:
P Q −−→ P; P Q −−→ Q:
External choice. P✷Q represents an external or environmental choice. The process
oFers the environment a choice between P and Q. If a visible event of either process
is performed, then that resolves the choice:
P a−−→ P′
a = ;
P ✷ Q a−−→ P′
Q a−−→ Q′
a = :
P ✷ Q a−−→ Q′
However, the choice is not resolved by internal transitions:
P −−→ P′
;
P ✷ Q −−→ P′ ✷ Q
Q −−→ Q′
:
P ✷ Q −−→ P ✷ Q′
Hiding. P\A is the process that acts like P, except all events from the set A are
hidden, i.e. made internal. The operational semantics replaces each event of P from A
by the internal event :
P a−−→ P′
a ∈ A;
P\A −−→ P′\A
P a−−→ P′
a  ∈A:
P\A a−−→ P′\A
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Blocking. P\A is the process that acts like P, except all events from the set A are
blocked, i.e. cannot occur:
P a−−→ P′
a  ∈A
P\A a−−→ P′\A
If P can perform only events from A, then P\A deadlocks.
Parallel composition. P ‖
A
Q represents a parallel composition of P and Q, synchronis-
ing on events from A. If one component of the parallel composition can perform an
event not in the synchronisation set, then so can the parallel composition:
P a−−→ P′
a  ∈A;
P ‖
A
Q a−−→ P′ ‖
A
Q
Q a−−→ Q′
a  ∈A:
P ‖
A
Q a−−→ P ‖
A
Q′
If both sides of the parallel composition can perform an event in the synchronisation
set, then the parallel composition can perform that event:
P a−−→ P′
Q a−−→ Q′
a ∈ A:
P ‖
A
Q a−−→ P′ ‖
A
Q′
Recursion. X •P represents a recursive process, that acts like P with occurrences
of X representing recursive executions. The operational semantics represents the un-
winding of the recursion by a -transition:
X•P −−→ P[X•P=X ]:
Syntactic sugar. Below we de(ne a few pieces of syntactic sugar.
If c is a channel carrying values from the (nite set X , then we de(ne c?x→P(x) as
syntactic sugar for✷
x:X
c:x→P(x) (where✷ is a replicated version of the external
choice operator); this represents a process that can input a value x on channel c, and
then act like P(x).
We de(ne P |||Q as syntactic sugar for P ‖
{}
Q; this represents an interleaving, i.e. a
parallel composition without synchronisation.
If P⊆A, Q⊆B, then we de(ne P A‖B Q as syntactic sugar for P ‖
A∩B
Q; this
represents a parallel composition where the alphabets of each component are given
explicitly, and the processes synchronise on common events.
We de(ne P .Q as syntactic sugar for (P✷ a→Q)\a where a is a fresh event; this
represents a timeout.
G. Lowe / Theoretical Computer Science 315 (2004) 209–256 213
We de(ne CHAOS(A) by
CHAOS(A) =̂
(

a∈A
a→ CHAOS(A)
)
 STOP
(where  is a replicated version of the nondeterministic choice operator); this is the
most nondeterministic nondivergent process with alphabet A.
2.2. Multi-step transition rules and denotational semantics
Following Roscoe [19, p. 170], we de(ne two multi-step transition relations. The (rst
such relation includes internal  actions. If s= 〈a0; a1; : : : ; an−1〉 ∈ ()∗ is a sequence of
(possibly internal) actions, then we write P s−→Q if there exist P0 =P;P1; : : : ;Pn=Q
such that Pk
ak−−→ Pk+1 for each k ∈{0; : : : ; n− 1}.
The next multi-step transition relation is in terms of visible events, only. We write
P tr=⇒Q if there exists s such that P s−→Q and s\{}= tr. We adopt the convention
of writing tr, tr′, etc. for traces of visible events, and s, s′, etc. for traces possibly
including internal events.
We write traces(P) for the set of traces of visible events that P can perform:
traces(P) =̂ {tr | P tr=⇒}:
A process is stable if it can perform no internal events:
stable P =̂¬P −−→ :
A process refuses X if it is stable and can perform none of the events of X :
P ref X ⇔ stable P ∧ ∀ x ∈ X•¬P x−−→ :
A process has stable failure (tr;X ) if it can perform trace tr to evolve into a state
where it can refuse X ; we write failures(P) for the set of stable failures of P:
failures(P) =̂ {(tr;X ) | ∃P′•P tr=⇒P′ ∧ P′ ref X}:
A process diverges immediately if it can perform an in(nite sequence of internal
events:
div P ⇔ ∃P0 = P;P1; : : : ; • ∀ n ∈ N•Pn −−→ Pn+1:
A trace tr is a divergence of P if P can perform some pre(x of tr and then diverge:
divergences(P) =̂ {tr˙tr′ | ∃P′•P tr=⇒P′ ∧ div P′}:
The failures of a process are the stable failures, along with all (tr;X ) pairs for tr
a divergence; in other words, the failures include all possible behaviours following a
divergence, which is the traditional approach, as in [10].
failures⊥(P) =̂ failures(P) ∪ {(tr;X ) | tr ∈ divergences(P)}:
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Finally, we de(ne re(nement relations for the stable failures and failures–divergences
models:
P F Q =̂ traces(P) ⊇ traces(Q) ∧ failures(P) ⊇ failures(Q);
P FD Q =̂ failures⊥(P) ⊇ failures⊥(Q)∧
divergences(P) ⊇ divergences(Q):
3. Related work
In this section we review some previous work, thereby helping to illustrate the idea
of information #ow, and also to explain some of the shortcomings that we hope to
avoid.
In all our examples, we will take the user Low to have alphabet L, containing events
with names like l; and we will take the user High to have alphabet H , containing events
with names like h. We assume H ∩L= {}, and take =H ∪L.
3.1. Noninterference
One of the earliest attempts to formalise information #ow was by Goguen and
Meseguer [7], and called noninterference. Their formalism made use of determinis-
tic state machines, in a setting where all operations were always available.
Informally, a state machine P is noninterfering if for all traces tr of operations
(from some set ), and for all low-level operations l (from some set L⊆), the
result obtained by Low from l after tr is the same as he would have obtained had
no high-level operations been performed. In other words, the operations performed by
High during tr have had no eFect upon (have not interfered with) Low’s view of the
system.
This notion can be captured formally as follows:
Denition 1. A state-machine satis(es noninterference if:
∀ tr: ∗ ; l : L • result(P after tr; l) = result(P after (tr  L); l):
Here P after tr is the state P reaches following trace tr; result(P′; l) is the result
obtained from operation l in state P′; and tr L is the restriction of tr to low-level
operations.
A limitation of this formalism is that it applies only to deterministic systems.
3.2. Nondeducibility
In [21], Sutherland gives a de(nition of information #ow termed nondeducibility. The
idea is that Low should not be able to deduce anything about High’s input behaviour.
The formalism uses nondeterministic state machines, in a setting where outputs cannot
be blocked.
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Sutherland’s de(nition is rather abstract. He de(nes an information function to be a
function over system traces. Given information functions f1 and f2, he de(nes informa-
tion to #ow from f1 to f2 if there is some trace tr, and some value z that is achieved
by f2 on some system trace, such that
∀ tr′•f1(tr′) = f1(tr)⇒ f2(tr′) = z:
In other words, if A1 sees only the results of f1, and A2’s behaviour is captured by f2,
then if A1 sees f1(tr), he can deduce that A2 has not performed z.
This is specialised to the question of information #ow in multi-level security systems
by taking f1(tr) =̂ tr L and f2(tr) =̂ tr HI , where HI is the set of input events for
High.
In [1], Allen translates this condition into CSP as follows.
Denition 2. De(ne tracesL(P) and tracesHI (P) to be the sets of traces of low-level
events and high-level inputs, respectively:
tracesL(P) =̂ {tr  L | tr ∈ traces(P)};
tracesHI (P) =̂ {tr  HI | tr ∈ traces(P)}:
A process satis(es nondeducibility if for every pair of such traces trL and trHI , there
is a trace of the system compatible with both trL and trHI :
∀ trL : tracesL(P) ; trHI : tracesHI (P)•
∃ tr : traces(P)•tr  L = trL ∧ tr  HI = trHI :
In other words, if Low observes trL, he cannot deduce that High has not performed
input behaviour trHI .
This de(nition is quite strong, as demonstrated by the following example:
Example 1. Let
P =̂ l → STOP  h→ STOP:
There would seem to be no way for High to use P to pass information to Low. How-
ever, P does not satisfy nondeducibility, because 〈l〉 ∈ tracesL(P), 〈h〉 ∈ tracesHI (P),
but there is no trace compatible with both.
In [22], Wittbold and Johnson exhibit a weakness of this de(nition, making use of the
fact that it ignores high-level outputs. Sutherland worked in a synchronous model, but
the same weakness is apparent in an asynchronous setting; we translate their example
into CSP, for ease of exposition.
Example 2. Let High have input channel hin carrying values {q; 0; 1}; and let High
and Low have output channels hout and lout, respectively, each carrying values {0; 1}.
The example process is parameterised by two keys k1; k2 : {0; 1}, both of which are
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initialised nondeterministically.
P(k1; k2) = hin :q→ hout :k1 → lout :k2 →
k′2:{0;1}
P(k1; k′2)
✷
hin?x : {0; 1} → lout :(x ⊕ k1)→
k′1 ;k
′
2:{0;1}
P(k′1; k
′
2):
If High inputs q then he receives k1, Low receives k2, and k2 is updated nondeter-
ministically; if High inputs x∈{0; 1} then Low receives x⊕ k1, where ⊕ represents
exclusive-or, and both k1 and k2 are updated nondeterministically.
It can be shown that this process satis(es nondeducibility: for every sequence of
high-level inputs, Low can receive an arbitrary sequence of outputs. But there is a
simple strategy that allows High to pass information: to pass the bit b, High inputs q
to learn the value k1 (Low receives k2, which he ignores), then inputs k1⊕ b, causing
Low to receive (k1⊕ b)⊕ k1 = b; this strategy can be iterated.
Wittbold and Johnson adapt nondeducibility to de(ne nondeducibility on strategies:
High’s behaviour, or strategy, is modelled by a function from observed outputs to
subsequent inputs; Low’s view of the system should then be compatible with all high-
level strategies.
3.3. Invariance
Various authors have produced de(nitions of information #ow based on the notion
of invariance: the behaviour of the system as seen by Low should not vary as a result
of behaviour of High.
One such de(nition is due to Ryan [20]. Ryan de(nes a process P to be invariant
in L if whenever tr and tr′ are two traces of P that diFer only in events performed
by High, then Low’s view of P should be the same after tr as after tr′. In a process
algebraic setting, it is normally assumed that the only ways in which Low can interact
with the system are through performing events or having events refused. The events
available to Low following trace tr can be written as: 1
initsL(P after tr) =̂ {a ∈ L | tr˙〈a〉 ∈ traces(P)}:
Similarly, the refusals from L following tr can be written as:
refsL(P after tr) =̂ {X ∈ PL | (tr;X ) ∈ failures(P)}:
Hence Ryan’s de(nition of security can be formalised as follows:
Denition 3. A process is said to be failures-invariant in L if:
INVL(P) =̂ ∀ tr; tr′ ∈ traces(P)•trO|L = tr′O|L⇒
initsL(P after tr) = initsL(P after tr′)
∧refsL(P after tr) = refsL(P after tr′):
1 For convenience, we have adapted Ryan’s notation, slightly.
G. Lowe / Theoretical Computer Science 315 (2004) 209–256 217
Similar CSP-based de(nitions have been proposed by Allen [1], Graham-Cumming
[8] and Jacob [12].
Example 3. Consider the process
P1 =̂ h→ l → STOP:
This is correctly identi(ed as insecure. Consider, for example, the traces tr =̂ 〈〉 and
tr′ =̂ 〈h〉; then tr L= 〈〉= tr′ L, but
initsL(P1 after tr) = {} = initsL(P1 after tr′) = {l}:
The event l is available to Low if and only if High performs h, so this represents a
#ow of information from High to Low.
Example 4. The process
P2 =̂ h→ l → STOP ✷ l → STOP
is secure, because the behaviour of the process from Low’s point of view does not
vary as a result of High’s behaviour; for example, taking tr =̂ 〈〉, tr′ =̂ 〈h〉:
initsL(P2 after tr) = {l} = initsL(P2 after tr′);
refsL(P2 after tr) = P(L − {l}) = refsL(P2 after tr′):
The event l is available to Low regardless of whether or not High performs an h.
However, this de(nition mis-classi(es some processes.
Example 5. Consider the process
P =̂ l → STOP . h→ STOP:
This is not failures-invariant, for consider the traces tr =̂ 〈〉, tr′ =̂ 〈h〉; then
initsL(P after tr) = {l} = initsL(P after tr′) = {}:
However, there appears to be no way in which High can use this process to pass
information to Low: it is the occurrence of the timeout that changes Low’s view of
the system, rather than any action of High.
Example 6. Consider:
Q1 =̂ h→ (l → STOP  STOP)
✷
(l → STOP  STOP):
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This satis(es failures-invariance, because Low will, nondeterministically, either be able
to perform an l, or will have the l refused, whether or not High performs an h. So,
for example, again taking tr =̂ 〈〉, tr′ =̂ 〈h〉:
initsL(Q1 after tr) = {l} = initsL(Q1 after tr′);
refsL(Q1 after tr) = P(L) = refsL(Q1 after tr′):
However, this assumes that the two diFerent nondeterministic choices are implemented
in the same way, which is by no means necessary. The normal intuition in CSP is that
a nondeterministic choice represents under-speci(cation: this can be resolved by the
implementer deciding how to implement the under-speci(cation, or it can be resolved
by some mechanism at run time. For example, if the (rst nondeterministic choice is
implemented to always select its (rst argument, and the second nondeterministic choice
is implemented to always select its second argument, then Q1 will act like
h→ l → STOP ✷ STOP = h→ l → STOP;
which is the process P1 from Example 3, and which does not satisfy failures-invariance.
In other words we have a process Q1 that is considered secure, but one of its imple-
mentations, P1, is insecure.
Similarly, if the two nondeterministic choices act probabilistically, but with diFerent
associated probabilities, then there will be a (probabilistic) #ow of information to Low.
For these reasons, we would consider this process to be insecure, contrary to the
de(nition of failures-invariance.
Example 7. Let LEAK be the following—clearly insecure—process
LEAK =̂ h?x→ l :x→ LEAK ;
which receives input from High and passes it to Low. Consider also the process
LEAK CHAOS(). This process is equivalent to CHAOS() in the failures-diver-
gences model. CHAOS() satis(es the above de(nition of security, because
initsL(CHAOS() after tr) = L
refsL(CHAOS() after tr) = P(L);
for every trace tr. However, LEAK CHAOS() should be considered insecure,
because it can evolve into a state, LEAK , that is insecure.
3.4. Nondeducibility on compositions
In [2–4], Focardi, Gorrieri and Martinelli de(ne several security properties, jointly
termed Non Deducibility on Composition (NDC). We can translate these properties
into CSP as follows, writing CSPH for the set of high-level CSP processes:
∀Q ∈ CSPH•P ‖
H
STOP ≡
(
P ‖
H
Q
)∖
H ;
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where the nature of the equivalence depends upon the security property in question:
bisimulation, failures and timed-bisimulation are all considered. In other words, how-
ever High acts, as captured by the process Q, Low’s view of the system, as captured
by
(
P ‖
H
Q
)∖
H , does not change.
These de(nitions all suFer from the problems identi(ed in Examples 6 and 7:
apparently secure processes can be re(ned by insecure ones.
3.5. Independence through determinism
In an attempt to overcome the problems described above, Roscoe introduced a def-
inition of security based upon determinism [18,19]. Essentially, Roscoe considers a
process to be secure if Low’s view of the process is deterministic: this implies, in
particular, that High cannot change Low’s view.
Recall that in CSP a process is nondeterministic if there is some trace tr and some
event a such that following trace tr, the event a can be either performed or refused:
∃ tr ∈ ∗ ; a ∈ •tr˙〈a〉 ∈ traces(P) ∧ (tr; {a}) ∈ failures(P);
and is deterministic otherwise.
For a divergence-free process P, Roscoe de(nes the lazy abstraction of P to L (and
away from H), written LH (P), to be the divergence-free process with failure set:
{(tr\H ;X ) | (tr;X ∩ L) ∈ failures(P)}:
High-level events are hidden in the traces; the refusal sets are closed up to include
extra high-level events.
Roscoe’s de(nition of security is then as follows:
Denition 4. A (nitely nondeterministic, divergence-free process P is lazily indepen-
dent from H (written LINDH (P)) if and only if LH (P) is deterministic.
Example 8. Consider again the process
P1 =̂ h→ l → STOP
from Example 3. This is correctly identi(ed as insecure, because LH (P1) can perform
the trace 〈l〉 (corresponding to the trace 〈h; l〉 of P1), but also has the failure (〈〉; {l})
(corresponding to the failure (〈〉; {l}) of P1).
Example 9. Recall the process
Q1 =̂ h→ (l → STOP  STOP)
✷
(l → STOP  STOP)
from Example 6. This is identi(ed as insecure—as we believe it should be—because
its lazy abstraction is nondeterministic; there are several ways of seeing this, but the
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way most closely related to the discussion of the previous subsection is to note that
LH (Q1) can perform the trace 〈l〉 (corresponding to the trace 〈h; l〉 of Q1), but also
has the failure (〈〉; {l}) (corresponding to the failure (〈〉; {l}) of Q1).
However, this de(nition of security identi(es some processes as being insecure, when
really they should be considered as secure.
Example 10. The process
P3 =̂ l → STOP  l ′ → STOP
is #agged as insecure, because of the nondeterminism, even though High can not
perform any events, and so has no way of in#uencing the nondeterminism so as to
pass information to Low.
Example 11. The process
P4 =̂ h→ STOP ||| (l → STOP  l ′ → STOP)
is similarly #agged as being insecure for the same reason as with the process in the
previous example. However, if this system really were built as the interleaving above
then the High and Low parts of the process would be independent, and so would have
no way of communicating.
Example 12. Finally, consider the process
Q2 =̂ (h→ l → STOP ✷ l → STOP)

h→ STOP:
This is considered insecure, again because of the nondeterminism. However, the non-
deterministic choice is resolved before High’s action, so High can have no in#uence
upon how the choice is resolved, and hence High cannot in#uence what events are
available to Low, so there is no way for High to pass information to Low.
Note, though, that the two processes Q1 and Q2 of Examples 9 and 12 are considered
equivalent in all standard models of CSP; but, we consider Q1 to be insecure, and Q2
to be secure. This shows that standard models of CSP are not suRcient for reasoning
about information #ow. The diFerence between these two processes is that they display
diFerent branching behaviour, which has an eFect upon their security; standard models
of CSP abstract away from such diFerences. It is clear, therefore, that any model that
hopes to accurately identify information #ow must be more discriminatory than the
standard models.
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3.6. Local noninterference
In [6], Forster considers several de(nitions of information #ow, termed local nonin-
terference. One of his de(nitions is the following:
Denition 5. Let P be a process whose alphabet is partitioned by H and L. P satis(es
strong failures-divergences local noninterference, written SLNIFD(P), if 2
∀Q ∈ States(P)• ∀ h ∈ H
if Q h−−→ Q′
then failures(Q\H) = failures(Q′\H)
∧ divergences(Q\H) = divergences(Q′\H):
The de(nition essentially says that the behaviour of the system, from Low’s point
of view, cannot be changed by actions of High.
The quanti(cation over all states of P is to deal with processes like LEAK 
CHAOS() from Example 7, where a potential insecurity can be masked by behaviour
elsewhere in the system.
Example 13. Consider the process P1 =̂ h→ l→STOP from Example 3. This does
not satisfy this condition because P1
h−−→ l→STOP, and failures(P1\H) = failures
((l→STOP)\H).
Example 14. Consider also the process
Q2 =̂ (h→ l → STOP ✷ l → STOP)  h→ STOP
from Example 12. This has two high level transitions:
• h→ l→STOP✷ l→STOP h−−→ l→STOP and
failures((h→ l → STOP ✷ l → STOP)\H) =
failures((l → STOP)\H);
and likewise for divergences;
• h→STOP h−−→STOP and
failures((h→ STOP)\H) = failures(STOP\H);
and likewise for divergences.
Hence the condition is satis(ed.
2 States(P) represents all the states of P; i.e. all processes Q such that P s−→Q for some s.
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Example 15. Consider, however, the process
Q1 =̂ h→ (l → STOP  STOP) ✷ (l → STOP  STOP):
from Example 6. This satis(es the above condition, because
Q1
h−−→ l → STOP  STOP
and failures(Q1\H)= failures((l→STOP STOP)\H), and likewise for divergences.
However, this is in contravention of our intuition, outlined above, that this process
should be considered insecure.
4. Introduction to the operational model
The overall aim of this paper is to correctly capture the notion of information #ow.
We aim to produce a de(nition of information #ow that does not suFer from the
weaknesses of existing de(nitions, described in the previous section.
As the previous remarks make clear, existing models do not make enough discrim-
inations between processes. We therefore have to introduce a new semantic model,
which makes more distinctions.
A critical feature of the model will be that it will deal with nondeterministic choices
in such a way that we can argue about the ways in which the choices are resolved, so
that we can deal correctly with processes such as Q1 from Example 6.
In this section we give an informal introduction to the operational model we will
use to capture information #ow; this will help to further explain our intuitions about
information #ow.
The main diRculty we face is that posed by nondeterminism. We want to be able
to investigate whether the nondeterministic choices of a process can be resolved in a
way that would allow a #ow of information. Consider, again, the process
P4 =̂ h→ STOP ||| (l → STOP  l ′ → STOP):
We would not expect the nondeterministic choice on the right to be in#uenced by
whether or not the h event has been performed. However, traditional operational models
do not provide enough information to capture this. For example, the standard transition
diagram for the above process is as in Fig. 1. The nondeterministic choice can be
resolved in two diFerent places in this diagram, either before or after the h is performed.
However, it is the same nondeterministic choice in each case, and should be resolved
in the same way. The transition diagram does not include enough information to record
this fact.
Our operational model will therefore use a labelled transition diagram, but where the
transitions contain extra information, which we call markers, recording when diFerent
transitions correspond to the same nondeterministic choice being resolved.
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Fig. 1. Traditional transition diagram for P4.
Fig. 2. Transition diagram with markers for P4.
For example, the process P4 will be represented by the transition system in Fig. 2,
where the 
i are the markers mentioned above.
3 Note that in both places where the
nondeterministic choice is resolved, the transition representing the choice being resolved
to the left (in favour of l) is given the marker 
2, while the transition representing the
choice being resolved to the right (in favour of l ′) is given the marker 
4.
Our intuition is that identically labelled nondeterministic choices should be resolved
in the same way; however, we have no way of determining a priori how these choices
3 The choice of the subscripts for the 
s is for consistency with the formal de(nition of the operational
model we will present in the next section; the reader is advised not to study them too closely for the moment.
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Fig. 3. Transition diagram for Q1.
will be resolved. We need to de(ne a mechanism for resolving the nondeterministic
choice, which we will term a demon. We will suppose that the demon makes his
decisions as to how to resolve the nondeterministic choices based upon the markers on
the available transitions; this will mean that he does indeed resolve diFerent instances
of the same nondeterministic choice in the same way.
The normal intuition in CSP is that a nondeterministic choice may represent either
under-speciBcation, which the implementor of the process can resolve, or unpredictable
behaviour, which is resolved at run time. Our notion of demon captures both of these
forms.
We will represent a demon by a total order over the markers, corresponding to the
demon’s order of preference for those markers. For example, if in Fig. 2 the demon
prefers 
2 to 
4, then the nondeterministic choice will be resolved in favour of the
event l, regardless of where in the diagram the nondeterministic choice is resolved,
i.e. regardless of High’s actions.
Note that all the transitions in the transition diagram receive additional markers, not
just those representing nondeterministic choices: this is because such transitions can
become nondeterministic, for example by the application of the hiding operator.
Consider, again, the two processes:
Q1 =̂ h→ (l → STOP  STOP) ✷ (l → STOP  STOP);
Q2 =̂ (h→ l → STOP ✷ l → STOP)  h→ STOP;
from Examples 6 and 12, that standard models fail to distinguish. The transition dia-
grams for these processes are in Figs. 3 and 4. For the moment, we will just present
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Fig. 4. Transition diagram for Q2.
the transition diagrams, so as to illustrate our intuition; we will show how they are
obtained in the next section.
Consider what happens when Q1 is in the presence of a demon that prefers 
3 to 
5,
and prefers 
4 to 
2. If High performs h, then the demon will select the nondeterministic
transition labelled with 
3, and so Low will be able to perform l. Alternatively, if High
does not performs h then Low will not be able to perform l. Hence, Low’s view of the
process will depend upon High’s behaviour, and so we have captured the insecurity of
this process.
Compare this, however, with Q2; here, the nondeterministic choice is resolved before
High does any action, and so is independent of High’s action. If the demon prefers

1 to 
2, then Low will be able to perform l, whether or not High performs h; and
if the demon prefers 
2 to 
1 then Low will be unable to perform l, whether or not
High performs h; the change in Low’s view of Q2 is caused by the demon, rather than
High; hence this process is secure.
5. Operational semantics
In this section we will formally de(ne the operational semantic model that we in-
troduced in the previous section.
We assume some set Marker of markers, ranged over by 
, 
′, etc. We write
MarkerSeq for the set of countably in(nite sequences of distinct markers: 4
MarkerSeq =̂ { |  ∈Marker! ∧ ∀ i; j ∈ N1•i = j ⇒ (i) = ( j)}:
We let , ′, etc. range over MarkerSeq.
4Marker! represents the set of countably in(nite sequences with elements taken from Marker; (i)
represents the ith element of sequence , counting from 1.
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It turns out to be convenient to label transitions that correspond to synchronisations
between parallel components with pairs of markers, one marker corresponding to each
parallel component. For example, a synchronisation of the process P ‖
A
Q might be
labelled by the pair of markers (
P ; 
Q) where 
P corresponds to P and 
Q corresponds
to Q. In such compositions, we will also use notation such as (
P ; ) to represent an
event performed by only P, where the 
P corresponds to P, and the “ ” indicates that
Q performs no part in the event.
We de(ne CpdMarker to be the space of all such compound markers:
 ∈ CpdMarker ::= 
 | (; ) | (; ) | ( ; ):
We will de(ne operational semantics for a process with respect to some initial se-
quence of markers; the markers from this sequence are used to label the transitions.
We will write
(P; )
a;−−→ (P′; ′)
to mean that the process P, with marker sequence , can perform the event a, marked
with , and evolve into process P′, with remaining markers ′. The (possibly com-
pound) marker  will be built up from markers in ; the remaining markers ′ will
be a subsequence of .
Throughout this paper, we de(ne relations and functions similar to those from [10],
described in Section 2, and use similar notation; however, we take care to distinguish
them, by the number of arguments.
We call a process–marker sequence pair (P; ) a conBguration:
ConBg =̂CSP ×MarkerSeq:
Formally, the relation:
−−→: P(ConBg× ( × CpdMarker)× ConBg)
is de(ned by the rules in the following subsections.
The parts of the rules concerning the events performed and the ways in which
processes evolve will be identical to the traditional operational semantics, given in
Section 2.1. What is new is the treatment of markers. In several places in the rules, we
have to decide how the markers are allocated to diFerent transitions in the transition
diagram. Often these decisions are made fairly arbitrarily, and certainly could have
been made diFerently. We present speci(c allocations of markers merely for the sake
of de(niteness.
We will adopt the normal operational semantics conventions, for example writing
(P; )
a;−−→ as a shorthand for ∃P′; ′•(P; ) a;−−→ (P′; ′).
5.1. Transition rules
STOP. The process STOP can perform no transitions.
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Prexing. The process a → P can perform an a and evolve into process P; in the
context of a con(guration of the form (a → P; 
 : ), 5 the transition receives the
marker 
, and the markers  are used to label subsequent transitions. Formally:
(a→ P; 
 : ) a;
−−→ (P; ):
Nondeterministic choice. In a nondeterministic choice P Q, the (rst two markers in
the associated marker sequence are used to label the nondeterministic choice itself,
while the rest of the markers are split, alternately, between P and Q:
(P Q; 
 : 
′ : ) ;
−−→ (P; odds );
(P Q; 
 : 
′ : ) ;

′
−−→ (Q; evens );
where the operators odds and evens select the elements of a sequence with odd or
even indices, respectively. Formally:
odds(
 : 
′ : ) =̂ 
 : odds ;
evens(
 : 
′ : ) =̂ 
′ : evens :
External choice. Similarly, in an external choice of the form P✷Q, the markers are
split, alternately, between P and Q, the odd indexed markers labelling P and the even
indexed markers labelling Q. If one of the processes, so labelled, can perform a visible
event, then this resolves the choice.
(P; odds )
a;−−→ (P′; ′)
a = ;
(P ✷ Q; )
a;−−→ (P′; ′)
(Q; evens )
a;−−→ (Q′; ′)
a = :
(P ✷ Q; )
a;−−→ (Q′; ′)
However, the choice is not resolved by internal  actions; if P can do an internal
transition to P′, then P✷Q can do an internal transition to P′✷Q, where subsequent
transitions are labelled using those markers left over for P, and those allocated to Q:
(P; odds )
;−−→ (P′; ′)
;
(P ✷ Q; )
;−−→ (P′ ✷ Q; interleave(′; evens ));
(Q; evens )
;−−→ (Q′; ′)
;
(P ✷ Q; )
;−−→ (P ✷ Q′; interleave(odds ;′))
5 We use the functional programming cons operator “:”, so 
 :  is the sequence whose (rst element is 
,
and which continues with the elements of .
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where the interleave operator essentially undoes the splitting of a sequence of markers:
interleave(
 : ; 
′ : ′) =̂ 
 : 
′ : interleave(;′):
Hiding. The operational semantics for P\A is derived immediately from the semantics
of P, by renaming events from A to the internal event :
(P; )
a;−−→ (P′; ′)
a ∈ A;
(P\A; ) ;−−→ (P′\A; ′)
(P; )
a;−−→ (P′; ′)
a  ∈A:
(P\A; ) a;−−→ (P′\A; ′)
Restriction. The operational semantics for P\A is similarly derived from the semantics
of P, by allowing only events not from A:
(P; )
a;−−→ (P′; ′)
a  ∈A:
(P\A; ) a;−−→ (P′\A; ′)
Parallel composition. In a parallel composition, the markers are split between the two
sides, as for the other binary operators. If one component of the parallel composition
can perform an event not in the synchronisation set, then so can the parallel composi-
tion; the markers labelling subsequent transitions are those left over from the subprocess
performing the event, combined with those of the other subprocess:
(P; odds )
a;−−→ (P′; ′)
a  ∈A;(
P ‖
A
Q; 
)
a;(; )−−→
(
P′ ‖
A
Q; interleave(′; evens )
)
(Q; evens )
a;−−→ (Q′; ′)
a  ∈A:(
P ‖
A
Q; 
)
a;( ;)−−→
(
P ‖
A
Q′; interleave(odds ;′)
)
If both sides of the parallel composition can perform an event in the synchronisation
set, then the parallel composition can perform that event; this event is labelled with a
marker composed from the markers for the sub-processes:
(P; odds )
a;P−−→ (P′; P)
(Q; evens )
a;Q−−→ (Q′; Q)
a ∈ A:(
P ‖
A
Q; 
)
a;(P ;Q)−−→
(
P′ ‖
A
Q′; interleave(P ; Q)
)
:
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Fig. 5. Transition diagrams for the processes h→(l→STOP  STOP) and l→STOP  STOP.
Recursion. Finally, recursions are unwound via a  event:
(X•P; 
 : ) ;
−−→ (P[X•P=X ]; ):
Remark. Note that when these rules are applied to the examples in the previous section,
they really do produce the labelled transition diagrams we claimed, when the operational
semantics is taken with respect to the initial sequence of markers  =̂ 〈
1; 
2; : : :〉. For
example, the semantics of the process
Q1 =̂ h→ (l → STOP  STOP) ✷ (l → STOP  STOP);
is indeed as in Fig. 3; we give the semantics for the two sub-processes
h→ (l → STOP  STOP) and l → STOP  STOP
with respect to the marker sequences odds  and evens , respectively, in Fig. 5. The
reader is encouraged to understand these transition diagrams, and how the transition
diagram for Q1 is obtained from them.
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5.2. Some lemmas
We now state a few lemmas concerning the operational semantics. Some proofs are
omitted and can be found in [15].
The following lemma relates the operational semantics, above, to the standard oper-
ational semantics from Section 2.1.
Lemma 1. If (P; )
a;−−→ (P′; ′) then P a−−→ P′. Conversely, if P a−−→ P′, then
for every , there exist , ′ such that (P; )
a;−−→ (P′; ′).
The following lemma shows that the operational semantics is essentially independent
of the choice of initial marker sequence. If we evaluate the operational semantics
with respect to two diFerent initial marker sequences, then we will obtain two similar
transition systems that diFer only by having had markers uniformly renamed.
Lemma 2. Let  : Marker→Marker be an injective function. We lift  to sequences
of markers by pointwise application:
(〈
1; 
2; : : : ; 
n〉) =̂ 〈(
1); (
2); : : : ; (
n)〉;
and to compound markers by component-wise application:
(; ′) =̂ ((); (′)); (; ) =̂ ((); ); ( ; ) =̂ ( ; ()):
Then
(P; )
a;−−→ (P′; ′) implies (P; ()) a;()−−→ (P′; (′)):
The markers labelling a transition are indeed taken from the initial marker sequence;
they do not appear in the resulting marker sequence; the markers in the resulting marker
sequence are a subset of those in the initial marker sequence. We de(ne the atomic
markers comprising a (possibly compound) marker by:
parts(
) =̂ {
};
parts(; ′) =̂ parts() ∪ parts(′);
parts(; ); parts( ; ) =̂ parts():
Then:
Lemma 3. If (P; )
a;−−→ (P′; ′) then: 6
• ∀ 
 ∈ parts()• 
 in ;
6 The notation 
 in  means that 
 is an element of the sequence .
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• ∀ 
 ∈ parts()•¬ 
 in ′;
• ∀ 
 in ′• 
 in .
Each marker will be used to label at most one transition from any state.
Lemma 4. If (P; )
a;−−→ (P′; ′) and (P; ) a
′ ;−−→ (P′′; ′′) then a = a′ ∧P′ = P′′ ∧
′ = ′′.
The transition graph is (nitely branching.
Lemma 5. Let P ∈CSP; ∈MarkerSeq; then the set of transitions from (P; ) is
Bnite.
6. Extracting denotational information
In this section we extract denotational information from the operational semantics
in the previous section. Much of the development follows that of [19], described in
Section 2. We begin by formalising the notion of demon, and de(ne the transitions of a
con(guration in the presence of a particular demon; in Section 6.2 we lift this to multi-
step transitions; in Section 6.3, we de(ne a denotational semantic model, similar to the
traditional denotational models of CSP; in Section 6.4 we de(ne some equivalence and
re(nement relations.
6.1. Demons
We model the demon who resolves the nondeterministic choices by a total order 6
over compound markers. If 6 ′ then we say that the demon prefers the marker ′
to ; the intuition is that the demon will select a transition labelled with ′ in preference
to one labelled with .
The following de(nition captures this, and also de(nes a healthiness property that
we will require of demons:
Denition 6 (Demons). A demon is a total order 6 over compound markers such that
for all 1, 2, :
1 6 2 ⇒ (1; )6 (2; ) ∧ (; 1)6 (; 2); (1)
1 6 2⇒ (1; )6 (2; ) ∧ (1; )6 (2; ) ∧
(; 1)6 ( ; 2) ∧ ( ; 1)6 (; 2): (2)
Eq. (1) says that preferences on one side of a parallel composition are re#ected in
overall preferences; it is equivalent to:
1 6 
′
1 ∧ 2 6 ′2 ⇒ (1; 2)6 (′1; ′2): (3)
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Eq. (2) similarly shows how preferences on one side of a parallel composition are
re#ected in overall preferences where the other side may or may not perform an action.
These healthiness conditions will be useful when we come to prove compositionality
results, in Section 8.5.1.
Where a particular demon 6 is obvious from the context, we will write ¿ for its
converse, ¡ for its strict version, and ¿ for its strict converse.
We introduce a new transition relation, describing the behaviour of a process in the
presence of a particular demon. We write (P; )
a
,−→
6
(P′; ′) if the con(guration (P; )
in the presence of demon 6 can perform the event a and evolve into (P′; ′). For
this to be the case:
• the initial con(guration itself should be able to perform the corresponding transfor-
mation, i.e. (P; )
a;−−→ (P′; ′), for some ;
• the demon should not prefer any other possible transition labelled with the same
event a, i.e.  ∃ ′ •(P; ) a;
′
−−→ ∧ ′¿;
• the demon should not prefer any internal transition, i.e.
 ∃ ′ •(P; ) ;
′
−−→ ∧ ′ ¿  :
The
a
,−→
6
transition is formally de(ned by the following rule:
(P; )
a;−−→ (P′; ′)
 ∃ ′ •(P; ) a;
′
−−→ ∧ ′ ¿ 
 ∃ ′ •(P; ) ;
′
−−→ ∧ ′ ¿ 
(P; )
a
,−→
6
(P′; ′)
Example 16. Consider
P =̂ a→ STOP  b→ STOP:
This has the following operational semantics with respect to the initial sequence of
markers 〈
1; 
2; : : :〉:
(P; 〈
1; 
2; : : :〉)
;
1−−→ (a→ STOP; 〈
3; 
5; : : :〉)
a;
3−−→ (STOP; 〈
5; 
7; : : :〉);
(P; 〈
1; 
2; : : :〉)
;
2−−→ (b→ STOP; 〈
4; 
6; : : :〉)
b;
4−−→ (STOP; 〈
6; 
8; : : :〉):
If we consider a demon 6 such that 
1¿
2 then:
(P; 〈
1; 
2; : : :〉)

,−→
6
(a→ STOP; 〈
3; 
5; : : :〉)
a
,−→
6
(STOP; 〈
5; 
7; : : :〉)
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(and no other transitions). Informally, the demon selects the left hand side of the
nondeterministic choice. Similarly, if 
2¿
1 then the demon selects the right hand
side of the nondeterministic choice.
Example 17. Consider
P=̂a→ STOP ✷ b→ STOP:
This has the following operational semantics with respect to the initial sequence of
markers 〈
1; 
2; : : :〉:
(P; 〈
1; 
2; : : :〉)
a;
1−−→ (STOP; 〈
3; 
5; : : :〉);
(P; 〈
1; 
2; : : :〉)
b;
2−−→ (STOP; 〈
4; 
6; : : :〉):
If we consider any demon 6 then both transitions are available:
(P; 〈
1; 
2; : : :〉)
a
,−→
6
(STOP; 〈
3; 
5; : : :〉);
(P; 〈
1; 
2; : : :〉)
b
,−→
6
(STOP; 〈
4; 
6; : : :〉):
The choice is resolved by the environment, not the demon.
Example 18. Consider
P=̂a→ STOP . b→ STOP:
This has the following operational semantics with respect to the initial sequence of
markers 〈
1; 
2; : : :〉:
(P; 〈
1; 
2; : : :〉)
a;
1−−→ (STOP; 〈
3; 
5; : : :〉);
(P; 〈
1; 
2; : : :〉)
;
2−−→ (b→ STOP; 〈
4; 
6; : : :〉)
b;
4−−→ (STOP; 〈
6; 
8; : : :〉):
If we consider a demon 6 such that 
2¿
1 then:
(P; 〈
1; 
2; : : :〉)

,−→
6
(b→ STOP; 〈
4; 
6; : : :〉)
b
,−→
6
(STOP; 〈
6; 
8; : : :〉):
Informally, this demon forces the timeout to occur, without allowing the environment
the chance to perform the a.
234 G. Lowe / Theoretical Computer Science 315 (2004) 209–256
Alternatively, if we consider a demon such that 
1¿
2, we have two possible
transitions from the initial state:
(P; 〈
1; 
2; : : :〉)
a
,−→
6
(STOP; 〈
3; 
5; : : :〉);
(P; 〈
1; 
2; : : :〉)

,−→
6
(b→ STOP; 〈
4; 
6; : : :〉)
b
,−→
6
(STOP; 〈
6; 
8; : : :〉):
The demon allows the environment to perform the a; however, the timeout may also
occur, in the case where the environment does not oFer an a.
Note that the latter pair of transitions represents a form of nondeterminism that
remains despite the fact that we have explicitly modelled the demon. It is necessary to
allow both transitions in the model when considering information #ow: if the event a
is a high level event, then we would expect High to be able to in#uence whether or
not the timeout occurs by either not oFering or oFering this event (respectively); if b
is a low level event, this will allow information #ow from High to Low.
The following two lemmas compare the relations −−→ and ,−→:
Lemma 6. Let P;P′ ∈CSP, ;′ ∈MarkerSeq and a∈; then
(∃6 ∈ Demon•(P; ) a,−→
6
(P′; ′))
⇔
(∃  ∈ CpdMarker•(P; ) a;−−→ (P′; ′)):
Note that the above result holds for both visible and internal events.
Lemma 7. Let P ∈CSP, ∈MarkerSeq; then
(∃  •(P; ) ;−−→)⇒
(
∀6 ∈ Demon•(P; ) ,−→
6
)
:
The following lemma relates the ,−→ relation to the standard operational semantics:
Lemma 8. • If (P; ) a,−→
6
(P′; ′) then P a−−→P′;
• If P a−−→P′, then ∀• ∃ 6; ′•(P; ) a,−→
6
(P′; ′);
• If P −−→, then ∀;6 •(P; ) ,−→
6
.
6.2. Multi-step transitions
We now de(ne two multi-step transition relations. The (rst such relation includes
internal  actions. If s = 〈a0; a1; : : : ; an−1〉 ∈ ()∗ is a sequence of (possibly internal)
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actions, then we write
(P; ) s−→
6
(Q; ′)
if there exist P0 =P;P1; : : : ;Pn=Q and 0 =;1; : : : ; n=′ such that
(Pk ; k)
ak
,−→
6
(Pk+1; k+1) for each k ∈{0; : : : ; n− 1}:
The next multi-step transition relation is in terms of visible events, only. We write
(P; ) tr=⇒
6
(Q; ′)
if there exists s such that (P; ) s−→
6
(Q; ′) and s\{}= tr.
The following lemma relates this relation to the corresponding one from Section 2.2:
Lemma 9. If (P; ) tr=⇒
6
(P′; ′) then P tr=⇒P′. Conversely, if P tr=⇒P′, then for every
, there exist 6, ′ such that (P; ) tr=⇒
6
(P′; ′).
6.3. Denotational information
The semantics so far has been operational in nature. We now extract some denota-
tional information from the operational semantics.
We say that a process P is stable in the presence of demon 6 and marker sequence
, written stable;6P, if it cannot perform any internal transitions:
stable;6 P=̂¬(P; ) ,−→
6
:
We say that a process refuses X (where X is a set of visible events), written P ref;6X ,
if the process is stable and cannot perform any events from X :
P ref;6 X ⇔ stable;6 P ∧ ∀ x ∈ X•¬(P; ) x,−→
6
:
We say that a process diverges immediately, written div;6P, if it can perform an
in(nite sequence of internal events:
div;6 P⇔∃P0 = P;P1; : : : ; 0 = ;1; : : : •
∀ n ∈ N•(Pn; n) ,−→
6
(Pn+1; n+1):
The following two lemmas relate these operators to the corresponding operators from
Section [19] and Section 2.2:
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Lemma 10.
stable P ⇒ ∀;6•stable;6 P;
P ref X ⇒ ∀;6•P ref;6 X ;
div P ⇒ ∀• ∃6•div;6 P:
Proof. The (rst two results follow directly from the de(nitions and Lemma 8.
For the third case, suppose div P, and (x . From the de(nition of divergence, there
exist P0 = P;P1; : : : such that Pn
−−→Pn+1 for each n∈N . We construct a demon to
select the corresponding transitions in our model. From Lemma 8, for each n∈N :
∀• ∃6; ′•(Pn; ) ,−→
6
(Pn+1; ′):
De(ne 0 =̂, and inductively de(ne 6n and n+1 such that:
(Pn; n)

,−→
6n
(Pn+1; n+1):
These -transitions are potentially all in terms of diFerent demons, so we now unify
them. Let the corresponding transitions with markers be
(Pn; n)
;n−−→ (Pn+1; n+1):
Note that by Lemma 3, the markers in n will not appear on any other transition from
a con(guration (Pm; m) for m¿n. Let demon 6 be such that the n (for n∈N) are
at the top of the order, in order; formally:
0 ¿ 1 ¿ : : : and if   ∈ {k | k ∈N} then ∀ n∈N•  ¡ n :
Then by construction this demon selects all the required transitions:
∀ n ∈ N•(Pn; n) ,−→
6
(Pn+1; n+1):
So div;6P, as required.
Lemma 11. For marker sequence  and demon 6:
stable;6P ⇒ stable P;
P ref;6X ⇒ P ref X ;
div;6P ⇒ div P:
Proof. The (rst and third equations follow directly from Lemma 8. For the second
equation:
P ref;6X
⇒〈de(nition〉
stable;6P ∧ ∀ x ∈ X•¬(P; ) x,−→
6
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⇒
〈
(rst equation ; de(ning rule for ,−→
〉
stable P ∧ ∀ x ∈ X• ∀  •¬(P; ) x;−−→
⇒〈Lemma 1〉
stable P ∧ ∀ x ∈ X•¬P x−−→
⇒〈de(nition〉
P ref X :
We use the above operators to de(ne analogues of the standard denotational functions
over CSP:
traces;6(P) =̂
{
tr | (P; ) tr=⇒
6
}
;
failures;6(P) =̂
{
(tr;X ) | ∃P′; ′•(P; ) tr=⇒
6
(P′; ′) ∧ P′ref′ ;6X
}
;
divergences;6(P) =̂
{
tr˙tr′ | ∃P′; ′•(P; ) tr=⇒
6
(P′; ′) ∧ div′ ;6P′
}
;
failures⊥;6(P) =̂ failures;6(P) ∪ {(tr;X ) | tr∈ divergences;6(P)}:
The following theorem relates this semantics to the standard denotational semantic
models:
Theorem 12.
traces(P) =
⋃{traces;6(P) |  ∈MarkerSeq;6 ∈ Demon};
failures(P) =
⋃{ failures;6(P) |  ∈MarkerSeq;6 ∈ Demon};
divergences(P) =
⋃{divergences;6(P) |  ∈MarkerSeq;6 ∈ Demon};
failures⊥(P) =
⋃{ failures⊥;6(P) |  ∈MarkerSeq;6 ∈ Demon}:
Proof. We prove the results for stable failures and divergences; the result for traces
is similar to that for stable failures; the result for unstable failures follows from the
results for stable failures and divergences.
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The proof for failures is as follows:⋃{failures;6(P) |  ∈MarkerSeq;6 ∈ Demon}
= {(tr;X ) | ∃;6 • ∃P′; ′•(P; ) tr=⇒
6
(P′; ′) ∧ P′ref′ ;6X}
=
〈
Lemmas 9 and 11 in the forward direction;
Lemmas 9 and 10 in the reverse direction
〉
{(tr;X ) | ∃P′•P tr=⇒P′ ∧ P′ref X}
= failures(P):
For divergences, we proceed via a number of intermediate results, which can be
used to unify two demons involved in a divergence.
1. First, we show that if (P; )
a
,−→
61
(P′; ′) s−→
62
(P′′; ′′)∧div′′ ;62P′′, then there exists
6 such that (P; )
〈a〉˙s−→
6
(P′′; ′′) ∧ div′′ ;6P′′. Suppose that the (rst transition in
the hypothesis corresponds to marker :
(P; )
a;−−→ (P′; ′):
Note that from Lemma 3, the markers in  are not used to label any subsequent
transitions from P′. Let demon 6 be de(ned by taking 62 and moving  to the
top of the order; formally:
′ 6 ′′ ⇔ ′′ = ∨ ′ 62 ′′ ∧ ′ =  = ′′ :
Then by construction (P; )
a
,−→
6
(P′; ′) s−→
6
(P′′; ′′) ∧ div′′ ;6P′′.
2. We can then show that if (P; ) s−→
61
(P′; ′)∧ div′ ;62P′ then there exists 6 such
that (P; ) s−→
6
(P′; ′) ∧ div′ ;6P′. The proof of this result is a straightforward
induction on the length of s, using the previous result in the inductive step.
3. We then immediately obtain that if (P; ) tr=⇒
61
(P′; ′)∧div′ ;62P′ then there exists
6 such that (P; ) tr=⇒
6
(P′; ′) ∧ div′ ;6P′.
4. Finally, we can prove the main result:⋃{divergences;6(P) |  ∈MarkerSeq;6 ∈ Demon}
= {tr˙tr′ | ∃;6• ∃P′; ′•(P; ) tr=⇒
6
(P′; ′) ∧ div′ ;6P′}
=
〈
Lemmas 9; 11 for the forward direction;
Lemmas 9; 10 and the above result for the reverse direction
〉
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{tr˙tr′ | ∃P′•P tr=⇒P′ ∧ divP′}
= divergences(P):
Note that the quanti(cations over  in the set comprehensions of the above theorem
are unnecessary, because of Lemma 2; for example
traces(P) =
⋃{traces;6(P) |6 ∈ Demon} for all  ∈MarkerSeq:
Of course, we do not necessarily have traces(P)= traces;6(P) (and hence likewise
for failures and divergences): consider the process Q1 in Fig. 3 with a demon 6 such
that 
5¿
3; the trace 〈h; l〉 is in traces(Q1) but not in traces;6(Q1).
We will need the following property of the failures of a process. If a divergence-free
process is unable to perform events from some set X , then it can refuse X :
Lemma 13. If P is divergence-free, and
tr ∈ traces;6(P) ∧ ∀ x ∈ X•tr˙〈x〉 ∈ traces;6(P)
then
(tr;X ) ∈ failures;6(P):
6.4. ReBnement and equivalence
We can de(ne notions of re(nement between processes. We say that P is re(ned
by Q if for every way of resolving the nondeterminism of Q, there is some way
of resolving the nondeterminism of P such that the two processes have the same
behaviour; that is, for every demon for Q it is possible to (nd a demon for P such
that the two processes have identical behaviours. We de(ne two notions of re(nement,
corresponding to stable failures and to failures-divergences. 7
Denition 7.
P IFF Q =̂ ∀;6Q• ∃6P•traces;6P (P) = traces;6Q(Q) ∧
failures;6P (P) = failures;6Q(Q);
P IFFD Q =̂ ∀;6Q• ∃6P• failures⊥;6P (P) = failures⊥;6Q(Q) ∧
divergences;6P (P) = divergences;6Q(Q):
We prove that these re(nement relations satisfy some standard conditions.
7 Out re(nement relations have the superscripts “IF”, for “information #ow”, to distinguish them from
the re(nement relations in the standard models.
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Lemma 14. Nondeterministic choices are reBned by either of their components:
P Q  P and P Q  Q;
where the re(nement relation is either of the relations de(ned above.
Proof. We sketch the proof of the (rst statement. Pick a marker sequence = 〈
1;

2; : : :〉, and a demon 6 for P. Note that
(P Q; ) ;
1−−→ (P; ′) where ′ = 〈
3; 
5; : : :〉:
De(ne demon 6′ to select this transition, i.e. 
1¿
′ 
2, and then to act in the same
way over the resulting con(guration (P; ′) as 6 acts over (P; ); that is:
∀ ; ′ • 6 ′ ⇔ ()6′ (′);
where the function  maps a marker obtained from  to the corresponding marker
obtained from ′:
(
k) = 
2k+1;
extended pointwise to compound markers (as in Lemma 2). Then the graph of the ,−→
6′
relation for (P Q; ) is identical to that of the ,−→
6
relation for (P; ), except for an
additional initial -transition. Hence
traces;6′(P Q) = traces;6(P);
because the same traces of visible events are possible in both graphs, and the denota-
tional semantics ignores the initial -transition of P Q. Similarly, the stable failures,
unstable failures and divergences are equal. Hence P QP.
Lemma 15. P  Q if and only if P  P Q.
The proof is similar to that of the previous lemma.
We can use the above de(nitions of re(nement to de(ne equivalences between pro-
cess:
P ≡IFF Q=̂P IFF Q ∧Q IFF P;
P ≡IFFD Q=̂P IFFD Q ∧Q IFFD P:
The following corollary follows immediately from the previous two lemmas, and
gives an alternative characterisation of re(nement:
Corollary 16.
P  Q⇔ P ≡ P Q:
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The following theorem relates re(nement in this model to re(nement in the standard
models:
Theorem 17. If P is reBned by Q in our model, then the same is true in the standard
model:
P IFF Q⇒ P F Q;
P IFFD Q⇒ P FD Q:
Proof. Firstly, suppose PIFF Q. Then
failures(Q)
= 〈Lemma 12〉⋃{ failures;6Q(Q) |  ∈MarkerSeq;6Q ∈ Demon}
⊆ 〈from the assumption; and the de(nition of re(nement〉⋃{ failures;6P (P) |  ∈MarkerSeq;6P ∈ Demon}
= 〈Lemma 12〉
failures(P):
Similarly, traces(Q)= traces(P). Hence PF Q.
Similarly, if PIFFDQ we can show that failures⊥(Q)⊆failures⊥(P) and diver-
gences(Q)⊆ divergences(P), and hence PFD Q.
As an immediate corollary, our notions of equivalence are more discriminating than
the standard notions of equivalence.
Corollary 18.
P ≡IFF Q⇒ P ≡F Q;
P ≡IFFD Q⇒ P ≡FD Q:
Our equivalences are strictly more discriminating than the standard ones, as shown
by the processes Q1 and Q2 from Examples 6 and 12: these are equivalent in the
standard model, but distinct in our model.
7. Nondeterministic local noninterference
We are now ready to return to the question of information #ow. We use the semantic
model of the previous sections to produce a formal de(nition of information #ow. We
restrict ourself to divergence-free processes throughout the rest of the paper.
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Our de(nition of information #ow is a straightforward adaptation of Forster’s Local
Noninterference property:
Denition 8. We say that divergence-free process P satis(es nondeterministic local
noninterference (NLNI) if
∀Q ∈ States(P)• ∀;′;6• ∀ h∈H•
if (Q; )
h
,−→
6
(Q′; ′) then failures;6(Q\H) = failures′ ;6(Q′\H);
where States(P) is the set of states that P can reach (for some demon).
If a process can evolve via a high-level action, then this should not change the low-
level user’s view of the system. Note the quanti(cation over all demons: this means that
if there is any way of resolving the nondeterminism such that information is passed,
then the process should be considered insecure.
7.1. Examples
We now look at how our de(nition relates to some of the examples from the intro-
duction.
Example 19. Consider again the process:
Q1=̂h→ (l → STOP  STOP) ✷ (l → STOP  STOP)
from Example 6, which the invariance property mis-classi(es as secure. The operational
semantics for this process, with respect to the marker sequence 〈
1; 
2; : : :〉, is in Fig.
3. Consider a demon 6 such that 
3¿
5 and 
4¿
2, i.e. a demon that resolves
the (rst nondeterministic choice to the left, and the second to the right. Following the
de(nition of NLNI, de(ne:
Q = Q1; Q′ = l → STOP  STOP; ′ = 〈
3; 
5; : : :〉:
Then
(Q; )
h
,−→
6
(Q′; ′);
(〈l〉; { }) ∈ failures′ ;6(Q′\H);
(〈l〉; { })  ∈ failures;6(Q\H):
Hence this process does not satisfy NLNI.
Example 20. Consider next
Q2=̂(h→ l → STOP ✷ l → STOP)  h→ STOP;
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from Example 12, whose transition diagram, with initial marker sequence = 〈
1;

2; : : :〉, is in Fig. 4. To prove this satis(es nondeterministic local noninterference, we
consider the two h-transitions separately.
• Firstly, consider a demon 6 that selects the left hand side of the nondeterministic
choice, and let
Q = h→ l → STOP ✷ l → STOP; Q′ = l → STOP;
′ = 〈
3; 
5; : : :〉; ′′ = 〈
7; 
11; : : :〉:
Then
(Q; ′)
h
,−→
6
(Q′; ′′) and failures′ ;6(Q\H) = failures′′ ;6(Q′\H):
• Alternatively, consider a demon that selects the right hand side of the nondetermin-
istic choice, and let
Q = h→ STOP; Q′ = STOP;
′ = 〈
2; 
4; : : :〉; ′′ = 〈
4; 
6; : : :〉:
Then
(Q; ′)
h
,−→
6
(Q′; ′′) and failures′ ;6(Q\H) = failures′′ ;6(Q′\H):
Finally, we consider a process that Ryan’s de(nition identi(es as insecure, but which
we consider to be secure:
Example 21. Recall the process:
l → STOP . h→ STOP
from Example 5. This satis(es nondeterministic local noninterference, because the only
h-transition is from h→STOP to STOP, and these processes have the same failures
when H is blocked (regardless of the demon).
8. Some properties of nondeterministic local noninterference
In this section, we prove a few results about nondeterministic local noninterference.
8.1. Comparison with lazy independence
In this subsection we show that our de(nition is strictly weaker than Roscoe’s lazy
independence property from Section 3.5. We will need the following result, comparing
the failures of P with those of P\A.
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Lemma 19. For all P, tr, A, X ,  and 6,
tr  A = 〈 〉 ∧ (tr;X − A)∈ failures;6(P)
⇔
(tr;X )∈ failures;6(P\A):
The following lemma relates restriction in our model to lazy abstraction in the
standard model:
Lemma 20. If (tr;X )∈ failures;6(P\H) then (tr;X )∈ failures(LH (P)).
Proof. If (tr;X )∈ failures;6(P\H) then tr\H = tr and (tr;X ∩ L)∈ failures;6(P),
from the previous lemma. Hence (tr;X ∩ L)∈ failures(P) from Theorem 12, and so
(tr;X )∈ failures(LH (P)) from the de(nition of lazy abstraction.
We can now prove the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 21. If LINDH (P) (i.e. LH (P) is deterministic), then P satisBes NLNI.
Proof. We prove the contrapositive. Suppose P does not satisfy NLNI. Then for some
states Q and Q′ of P, marker sequences  and ′, and h∈H , we have
(Q; )
h
,−→
6
(Q′; ′) and failures;6(Q\H) = failures′ ;6(Q′\H):
We show that LH (Q) is nondeterministic, which implies that LH (P) is nondetermin-
istic.
Suppose, (rstly, that for some (tr;X ) that (tr;X )∈ failures;6(Q\H), but (tr;X )  ∈
failures′ ;6(Q′\H), and consider a shortest such tr. There are two cases to consider:
Case tr∈ traces′ ;6(Q′\H): Now,
(tr;X )  ∈ failures′ ;6(Q′\H);
so from Lemma 13, there is some x∈X such that
tr˙〈x〉 ∈ traces′ ;6(Q′\H):
Hence
tr˙〈x〉 ∈ traces(LH (Q′));
from Lemma 20, and so
tr˙〈x〉 ∈ traces(LH (Q));
using the de(nition of lazy abstraction. Also
(tr; {x})∈ failures′ ;6(Q\H)
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(because our model satis(es the property that if (tr;X ) is a failure of a process, then
so is (tr;Y ) for every Y ⊆ X , as in the standard failures model) and so
(tr; {x})∈ failures(LH (Q));
again from Lemma 20. Hence LH (Q) is nondeterministic.
Case tr  ∈ traces′ ;6(Q′\H): Let tr= tr′˙〈a〉. By the assumed minimality of tr,
tr′ ∈ traces′ ;6(Q′\H);
so from Lemma 13,
(tr′; {a}) ∈ failures′ ;6(Q′\H):
Hence
(tr′; {a}) ∈ failures(LH (Q′))
from Lemma 20, and so
(tr′; {a}) ∈ failures(LH (Q)):
But
tr = tr′˙〈a〉 ∈ traces;6(Q\H)
so
tr′˙〈a〉 ∈ traces(LH (Q))
again from Lemma 20. Hence LH (Q) is again nondeterministic.
The case where (tr;X )∈ failures′ ;6(Q′; \H) but (tr;X ) ∈ failures;6(Q\H) is
similar.
That our de(nition is strictly weaker than Roscoe’s is shown by the process P3 from
Example 10.
8.2. Comparisons with failures-divergences local noninterference
We now show that our de(nition of security is stronger than Forster’s failures-
divergences local noninterference property.
Theorem 22. If P satisBes NLNI, then it satisBes SLNI.
Proof. We prove the contrapositive. Suppose P does not satisfy SLNI. Then there
exists some Q;Q′ ∈States(P), h∈H , such that
Q h−−→ Q′ and failures(Q\H) = failures(Q′\H):
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Pick ; then from Lemma 1:
(Q; )
h;−−→ (Q′; ′);
for some ′, . Also, from Theorem 12, there is some demon 6 such that:
failures;6(Q\H) = failures′ ;6(Q′\H):
De(ne 6′ so as to select the h;  transition to Q′, then to act like 6. So
(Q; )
h
,−→
6′
(Q′; ′)
and
failures;6′(Q\H) = failures;6(Q\H)
= failures′ ;6(Q′\H)
= failures′ ;6′(Q′\H):
So P does not satisfy NLNI.
Our de(nition is strictly stronger than Forster’s, as shown by process Q1 from
Examples 15 and 19.
8.3. High and low processes
We now state two results which say that if either High or Low is unable to perform
any events, then the process is secure.
Theorem 23. 1. If P⊆L then NLNI(P);
2. If P⊆H then NLNI(P).
The (rst result is particularly worthy of note because it does not hold under Roscoe’s
de(nition of security, as shown by the process P3 from Example 10.
8.4. Closure under nondeterministic choice
We now show that our property is closed under nondeterministic choices.
Theorem 24. If NLNI(P1) and NLNI(P2) then NLNI(P1  P2).
Proof. Suppose Q∈States(P1 P2) and (Q; ) h,−→
6
(Q′; ′). Then Q = P1 P2, so
assume without loss of generality that Q∈States(P1). Then
failures;6(Q\H) = failures′ ;6(Q′\H);
from NLNI(P1), as required.
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8.5. Compositionality
We now consider the subject of compositionality. In Section 8.5.1 we prove some
results showing how behaviours of a parallel composition re#ect the behaviours of the
subcomponents. In Section 8.5.2 we do the opposite: we show how behaviours of the
components re#ect behaviours of a parallel composition. In Section 8.5.3 we compare
the failures of a parallel composition with those of its components, and in Section
8.5.4 we show that our nondeterministic local noninterference property is closed under
parallel composition with high level processes.
8.5.1. Compositional lemmas
In this section we state compositional results, i.e. results that show how behaviours
of a parallel composition re#ect behaviours of the subcomponents. We begin with the
,−→ relation.
Lemma 25. 1. If a∈A∩B, (P1; 1) a,−→
6
(P′1; 
′
1), and (P2; 2)
a
,−→
6
(P′2; 
′
2), then
(P1 A‖B P2; interleave(1; 2))
a
,−→
6
(P′1 A‖B P′2; interleave(′1; ′2)):
2. If a∈A− B, P2 is nondivergent, and (P1; 1) a,−→
6
, then
(P1 A‖B P2; interleave(1; 2))

,−→
6
∗ a
,−→
6
;
and similarly for transitions of P2.
3. If (P1; 1)

,−→
6
(P′1; 
′
1), and P2 is nondivergent, then
(P1 A‖B P2; interleave(1; 2))

,−→
6
∗
(P1 A‖B P′2; interleave(1; ′2))

,−→
6
(P′1 A‖B P′2; interleave(′1; ′2))
for some P′2 and 
′
2, and similarly for transitions of P2.
The proof uses the conditions on demons from De(nition 6.
However, it turns out that the above results cannot be extended to traces. One
might expect that if tr∈ (A∪B)∗, (P1; 1) trA=⇒
6
(P′1; 
′
1) and (P2; 2)
trB
=⇒
6
(P′2; 
′
2) then
(P1 A‖B P2; interleave(1; 2)) tr=⇒
6
(P′1 A‖B P′2; interleave(′1; ′2)). The following ex-
ample shows that this is not the case.
Example 22. Let
P1=̂a→ STOP;
P2=̂b→ STOP . STOP;
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and consider a demon that prefers the b event to the timeout, and prefers the timeout
to the a. Then P1 {a}‖{b} P2 cannot perform the trace 〈a; b〉 (although it can perform
〈b; a〉), despite the fact that the two components can perform their parts of that trace,
because the timeout would occur before the a, thus preventing the b from occurring.
This demon has a natural interpretation in a timed setting: the fact that the demon
prefers b to the timeout means that the b is available for some time before the timeout
occurs; the fact that the demon prefers the timeout to the a means that the a only
becomes available after the timeout occurs; putting these together, we see that the
trace 〈a; b〉 cannot occur.
One can, however, obtain some results about traces in the case that one side of the
parallel composition performs no events, as shown by the following lemma.
Lemma 26. If tr  B = 〈〉, (P1; 1) tr=⇒
6
(P′1; 
′
1), and P2 is nondivergent, then
(P1 A‖B P2; interleave(1; 2)) tr=⇒
6
(P′1 A‖B P′2; interleave(′1; ′2))
for some P′2, and 
′
2.
8.5.2. Decompositional lemmas
In this section, we state some results showing how behaviours of subcomponents
re#ect the behaviours of parallel compositions. We begin by considering the ,−→
relation.
Lemma 27. 1. If a∈A∩B, and
(P1 A‖B P2; interleave(1; 2))
a
,−→
6
(P′1 A‖B P′2; interleave(′1; ′2));
then
(P1; 1)
a
,−→
6
(P′1; 
′
1) and (P2; 2)
a
,−→
6
(P′2; 
′
2):
2. If a∈A− B, and
(P1 A‖B P2; interleave(1; 2))
a
,−→
6
(P′1 A‖B P2; interleave(′1; 2));
then
(P1; 1)
a
,−→
6
(P′1; 
′
1);
and similarly for transitions from B − A.
3. If
(P1 A‖B P2; interleave(1; 2))

,−→
6
(P′1 A‖B P′2; interleave(′1; ′2));
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then
(P1; 1)

,−→
6
(P′1; 
′
1) and (P2; 2) = (P
′
2; 
′
2);
or
(P2; 2)

,−→
6
(P′2; 
′
2) and (P1; 1) = (P
′
1; 
′
1):
We now extend the above result to traces. The following lemma shows how a trace
of a parallel composition is re#ected in traces of the components.
Lemma 28. If
(P1 A‖B P2; interleave(1; 2)) tr=⇒
6
(P′1 A‖B P′2; interleave(′1; ′2));
then:
(P1; 1)
trA
=⇒
6
(P′1; 
′
1) and (P2; 2)
trB
=⇒
6
(P′2; 
′
2):
8.5.3. Failures
We now extend the above results to failures. We (rst show how the failures of a
parallel composition are re#ected in the failures of the components.
Lemma 29. If (tr;X )∈ failuresinterleave(1 ;2);6(P1 A‖B P2), then
(tr  A;X ∩ (A− B)) ∈ failures1 ;6(P1);
(tr  B;X ∩ (B − A)) ∈ failures2 ;6(P2):
Proof. We just prove the (rst result. From the conditions of the lemma, for some P′1,
P′2, 
′
1, 
′
2:
(P1 A‖B P2; interleave(1; 2)) tr=⇒
6
(P′1 A‖B P′2; interleave(′1; ′2))
∧stableinterleave(′1 ;′2);6(P′1 A‖B P′2)
∧∀ x ∈ X•¬(P′1 A‖B P′2; interleave(′1; ′2))
x
,−→
6
:
From Lemma 28:
(P1; 1)
trA
=⇒
6
(P′1; 
′
1):
From the de(nition of stability:
stable′1 ;6(P
′
1) and stable′2 ;6(P
′
2):
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From Lemma 25:
∀ x∈X ∩ (A− B)•¬(P′1; ′1)
x
,−→
6
:
Hence
(tr  A;X ∩ (A− B)) ∈ failures1 ;6(P1):
We now show how the failures of a parallel composition re#ects the failures of the
subcomponents. As shown by Example 22, we do not have as strong a result as one
might expect. However, we have the following result, dealing with the case when one
side performs no events.
Lemma 30. If tr  B= 〈〉, X ∩ B= {}, Q2 is nondivergent, and
(tr;X ) ∈ failures1 ;6(Q1);
then
(tr;X ) ∈ failuresinterleave(1 ;2);6(Q1 A‖B Q2):
Proof. From the assumptions of the lemma and the de(nition of failures, we have
(Q1; 1)
tr=⇒
6
(Q′1; 
′
1) ∧ stable′1 ;6(Q′1) ∧ ∀ x∈X•¬(Q′1; ′1)
x
,−→
6
;
for some Q′1 and 
′
1. Then from Lemma 26
(Q1 A‖B Q2; interleave(1; 2)) tr=⇒
6
(Q′1 A‖B Q′2; interleave(′1; ′2));
for some Q′2 and 
′
2. Now, Q2 is nondivergent, and Q
′
1 is stable, so
(Q′1 A‖B Q′2; interleave(′1; ′2))

,−→
6
∗
(Q′1 A‖B Q′′2 ; interleave(′1; ′′2 ))
for some Q′′2 and 
′′
2 , with Q
′′
2 stable. Further,
∀ x ∈ X•¬(Q′1 A‖B Q′′2 ; interleave(′1; ′′2 ))
x
,−→
6
from the above, and Lemma 27. Hence
(tr;X ) ∈ failuresinterleave(1 ;2);6(Q1 A‖B Q2);
as required.
8.5.4. A closure property
We now prove that our de(nition satis(es a useful closure property, namely that it
is preserved by composition with high level processes: if P1 is secure, and (P2) ⊆ H
then P1 ‖
H
P2 is secure; P2 can be thought of as modelling a high level user; this result
says that this high level user cannot turn a secure process into an insecure one.
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We will need the following lemma.
Lemma 31. If B⊆H and Q2 is nondivergent then
failuresinterleave(1 ;2);6((Q1 A‖B Q2)\H) = failures1 ;6(Q1\H):
Proof. We calculate as follows:
(tr;X ) ∈ failuresinterleave(1 ;2);6((Q1 A‖B Q2)\H)
⇔〈Lemma 19〉
(tr;X −H) ∈ failuresinterleave(1 ;2);6(Q1 A‖B Q2) ∧ tr  H = 〈〉
⇔
〈
Lemma 29 in the forwards direction;
Lemma 30 in the backwards direction
〉
(tr;X −H) ∈ failures1 ;6(Q1) ∧ tr  H = 〈〉
⇔ 〈Lemma 19〉
(tr;X ) ∈ failures1 ;6(Q1\H):
We now prove the result alluded to above.
Theorem 32. If P1 satisBes NLNI, B ⊆ H and P2 is nondivergent, then P1 A‖B P2
satisBes NLNI.
Proof. Suppose Q1 A‖B Q2 ∈States(P1 A‖B P2) and
(Q1 A‖B Q2; )
h
,−→
6
(Q′1 A‖B Q′2; ′);
with h∈H (it is easy to show that all states and transitions of P1 A‖B P2 must be of
this form). We consider two cases:
Case h∈B − A: Then necessarily Q1 = Q′1 and odds = odds′. Hence
failures;6((Q1 A‖B Q2)\H)
= 〈Lemma 31〉
failuresodds;6(Q1\H)
= 〈from the above observation〉
failuresodds′ ;6(Q
′
1\H)
= 〈Lemma 31〉
failures′ ;6((Q
′
1 A‖B Q′2)\H);
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as required.
Case h∈A (whether or not h∈B): Then
(Q1; odds)
h
,−→
6
(Q′1; odds
′)
from Lemma 27. Hence
failures;6((Q1 A‖B Q2)\H)
= 〈Lemma 31〉
failuresodds;6(Q1\H)
= 〈P1 satis(es NLNI〉
failuresodds′ ;6(Q
′
1\H)
= 〈Lemma 31〉
failures′ ;6((Q
′
1 A‖B Q′2)\H);
as required.
The following corollary shows that our de(nition of information #ow satis(es
separability [11].
Corollary 33. If P1 ⊆ L, P2 ⊆ H , and P2 is nondivergent, then P1 ||| P2 satisBes
NLNI.
Surprisingly, perhaps, our property of nondeterministic local noninterference isn’t
closed under various other forms of composition. For example, one might expect that
whenever P1 and P2 both satisfy NLNI, then so does P1 ||| P2. The following example
shows that this is false:
Example 23. Let
P1=̂l1→ STOP ✷ h→ l1→ STOP;
P2=̂l2→ STOP . l3→ STOP:
Then P1 and P2 both satisfy NLNI.
However, consider P1 ||| P2 in the presence of a demon that prefers the (rst l1 event
to the timeout, and prefers the timeout to the second l1 event. (In a timed setting, this
demon would correspond to a situation where the (rst l1 event becomes available before
the timeout, but the second l1 event doesn’t.) In the initial state, the trace 〈l1; l2〉 is
possible; however, if the process performs an h-transition to l1→STOP ||| P2, then
the trace 〈l1; l2〉 becomes impossible, because the timeout would occur before the l1,
which would remove the possibility of the l2.
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Following the de(nition of NLNI, 〈l1; l2〉 is a trace of (P1 ||| P2)\H , but not of
(l1→STOP ||| P2)\H , and so P1 ||| P2 does not satisfy NLNI.
9. Discussion
In this paper we have presented a new de(nition of information #ow, nondetermin-
istic local noninterference. The de(nition is based upon a model of CSP that is more
discriminating than the standard models, and talks about the ways in which nondeter-
ministic choices are resolved. The model allows us to make more distinctions between
processes, which we have argued is necessary: we have presented examples of pro-
cesses that standard models fail to distinguish, but where one displays information #ow,
and the other doesn’t.
The de(nition of information #ow has much to recommend it: it produces the ex-
pected answer for all thought experiments we have tried so far; it satis(es pleasant
closure properties (Theorem 32 and Corollary 33); it gives no #ow of information if
either High or Low can perform no events (Theorem 23).
On the down-side, the model is moderately complicated, but I suspect that this is
inevitable, because we have to make quite (ne distinctions between processes.
Surprisingly, the model suFers from the reBnement paradox, where a secure process
can be re(ned by an insecure one, as shown by the following example.
Example 24. Consider
P =̂ l0→ l1→ STOP
.
l0→ (h→ l2→ STOP . l2→ STOP);
Q =̂ l0→ (l1→ STOP ✷ h→ l2→ STOP)
.
l0→ l2→ STOP:
Note that
• P is secure, because there is no way for High to aFect Low’s view of the system;
• Q is insecure, speci(cally in the state l1→STOP ✷ h→ l2→STOP;
• P is re(ned by Q: following De(nition 7, we need to show that for every demon
6Q for Q, there is a demon 6P for P that gives the same behaviour:
◦ if 6Q forces the timeout in Q then de(ne 6P to force both timeouts in P;
◦ if 6Q does not force the timeout in Q then de(ne 6P to force neither timeout
in P (note that the timeouts can still occur with such demons).
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One thing that is slightly odd about the above example is that Q’s insecure state,
l1→STOP ✷ h→ l2→STOP, does not correspond to any state of P. This suggests
that we should consider a stronger re(nement relation—possibly based around a simu-
lation relation—such that these two processes are not related. It might be the case that
such a stronger re(nement relation avoids the re(nement paradox.
The standard models of CSP have complete sets of algebraic laws (see, for example,
[19, Chapter 11]). It is clear, though, that our model does not satisfy all of these laws;
for example, our model distinguishes the processes Q1 and Q2 of Examples 6 and
12, which are equivalent in the standard models. It would be informative to discover
precisely which rules do and do not hold in our model.
One of the most appealing properties of Roscoe’s de(nition of security—in terms
of the determinism of the lazy abstraction of a process—is that it is eRciently check-
able using the model checker FDR [5,19]: the lazy abstraction of P is equivalent,
in the stable failures model, to
(
P ‖
H
CHAOS(H)
)∖
H , and so FDR can be used to
test whether this latter process is deterministic. I intend to investigate algorithms for
checking nondeterministic local noninterference.
The model in this paper considered only untimed processes. It would be interesting
to extend this model to consider time, so as to reason about information #ow caused
by timing information, through so-called timing covert channels. Timed models of
information #ow have been presented in [4,16].
Several researchers have attempted to extend process algebras with probabilities; for
example [9,13,14,17]. However, many of these approaches do not correctly model the
interplay between probabilities and nondeterminism. For example, consider the process
(a→ STOP ⊕1=2 b→ STOP) ‖ (a→ STOP  b→ STOP);
where ⊕p is a probabilistic choice operator that selects its left-hand side with proba-
bility p, and selects its right-hand side with probability 1 − p. One would expect the
nondeterministic choice to be resolved in a way that is independent of the way in
which the probabilistic choice is resolved. However, this is not the case with most ex-
isting models: such models eFectively allow the demon to see how probabilistic choices
elsewhere in the system have been resolved. I believe that extending the operational
model of the current paper with probabilistic transitions, and modelling the demons as
currently, would give the correct behaviour: the demon’s behaviour would depend upon
actions elsewhere in the system only if there has been a suitable information #ow.
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Appendix Index of notation
Notation Description Section
a;−−→ (P; ) a;−−→ (Q; ′) means P with marker sequence  can
perform event a, labelled with marker , and evolve into Q,
with remaining markers ′.
5
a
,−→
6
(P; )
a
,−→
6
(Q; ′) means P with marker sequence , and in
the presence of demon 6, can perform event a, and evolve
into Q, with remaining markers ′.
6.1
s−→
6
(P; ) s−→
6
(Q; ′) means P with marker sequence , and in
the presence of demon 6, can perform the trace s, possibly
including internal events, and evolve into Q, with remaining
markers ′.
6.2
tr=⇒
6
(P; ) tr=⇒
6
(Q; ′) means P with marker sequence , and in
the presence of demon 6, can perform the visible trace tr,
and evolve into Q, with remaining markers ′.
6.2
stable;6 stable;6P means that P with marker sequence , and in the
presence of demon 6, cannot perform any internal transitions.
6.3
ref;6 Pref;6X means that P with marker sequence , and in the
presence of demon 6, will refuse the set of events X .
6.3
div;6 div;6P means that P with marker sequence , and in the
presence of demon 6, can diverge, i.e. perform an in(nite
sequence of internal events.
6.3
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